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LETTING GO OF OLD IDEAS
William D. Henderson*
The Lawyer Bubble: A Profession in Crisis. By Steven J. Harper. New
York: Basic Books. 2013. Pp. xvi, 208. $26.99.
Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future. By Richard
Susskind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. Pp. ix, 165. $18.95.
Introduction
Two recently published books make the claim that the legal profession
has changed (Steven Harper’s The Lawyer Bubble: A Profession in Crisis1) or
is changing (Richard Susskind’s Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your
Future2). The books are interesting because they discuss the types of changes
that are broad, sweeping, and dramatic. In suitable lawyer fashion, both
books are unfailingly analytical. They both also argue that the old order is
collapsing. The Lawyer Bubble is backward looking and laments the legacy
we have squandered, while Tomorrow’s Lawyers is future oriented and offers
fairly specific prescriptive advice, particularly to those lawyers entering the
legal field at a time when the number of traditional (what I call “artisan”)
legal jobs is shrinking.
Many of us working in the legal industry are interested in this topic
because we are facing business conditions with no familiar historical ana-
logue. From my own vantage point as a law school professor, things look
pretty bleak. As a result of the precipitous, multiyear decline in applicant
rates and historical trends in admission and matriculation rates, the number
of law students who enrolled as 1Ls in the fall of 2013 fell below 40,0003—a
low-water mark not seen since the mid-1970s.4
* Professor of Law and Val Nolan Faculty Fellow, Indiana University Maurer School of
Law. I would like to thank Steven Harper and Richard Susskind for the rigor and energy they
bring to their work. Their contributions are worthy of lengthy reflection.
1. Steven Harper is an Adjunct Professor, Northwestern University School of Law and
Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences.
2. Richard Susskind is a Visiting Professor, Oxford Internet Institute, University of
Oxford.
3. See ABA Section of Legal Education Reports 2013 Law School Enrollment Data, Am.
Bar Ass’n (Dec. 17, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2013/12/aba_section_of_legal.html (reporting fall 2013 entering enrollment at 39,675
for the 202 law schools accredited by the American Bar Association).
4. See Enrollment and Degrees Awarded: 1963–2012 Academic Years, Am. Bar Ass’n,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admis-
sions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter En-
rollment and Degrees Awarded] (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
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It is certainly possible to rebound from a thirty-five-year low in entering
enrollment, but the statistics are not promising: In 1977, there were 163 law
schools accredited by the American Bar Association (“ABA”).5 In 2013, there
were 201,6 with even more in the accreditation pipeline.7 This represents a
23 percent increase in the bricks and mortar. Paying this increased overhead
might have been sustainable when incoming 1L enrollment peaked at 52,000
in the fall of 2010.8 But since 39,675 students enrolled in fall 2013, law
schools have experienced a 24 percent drop in incoming students over three
short years. A decline this large and swift is an enormous financial blow to
institutions that have high fixed costs (read: tenured faculty) and no experi-
ence coping with large-scale change. Further, the pain is likely to increase as
the comparatively larger incoming classes from fall 2011 and 2012 graduate
and their tuition revenues leave the building.9
Perhaps we should have seen this change coming. Over the last several
decades, the nature of legal practice has indeed changed. In 1975, scholars
from the American Bar Foundation conducted a major study of the Chicago
bar (“Chicago Lawyers I”).10 One of the most salient findings of the Chicago
Lawyers I study was that the legal profession had functionally divided into
two “hemispheres,” one serving individuals and small businesses and the
other working for large organizational clients such as corporations.11 Which
hemisphere a lawyer served turned out to be a remarkably accurate proxy for
a lawyer’s ethnicity, religion, law school, bar association and social club
memberships, home zip code, and annual income.12 The Chicago Lawyers I
study described these two groups as hemispheres not only because they were
of roughly equal size but also because their professional interests and net-
works seldom overlapped.13
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Jennifer Smith, Crop of New Law Schools Opens Amid a Lawyer Glut, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 1, 2013, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323926104578
276301888284108.html (discussing the opening of Indiana Tech in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and
the University of North Texas in Dallas).
8. See Enrollment and Degrees Awarded, supra note 4.
9. Some law schools are turning to LLM programs to fill the resulting financial gap, but
that strategy is far from a panacea. See, e.g., Bryce Stucki, LLM: Lawyers Losing Money, Am.
Prospect (May 8, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/llm-lawyers-losing-money (discussing the
“unregulated wasteland” of LLM degrees, which are being used to prop up law school finances,
in large measure because the ABA does not require any meaningful consumer information to
help assess the value of LLM degrees (quoting Professor Caron) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
10. John P. Heinz & Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Struc-
ture of the Bar (rev. ed. 1994).
11. Id. at 37, 127–28.
12. Id. at 136, 174.
13. Id. at 23–25, 174.
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In 1995, the same core group of researchers replicated this study (“Chi-
cago Lawyers II”).14 Over the intervening two decades, the organizational
sphere had expanded dramatically due to the proliferating legal needs of
corporate clients growing in size and geographic scope. The amount of time
that lawyers devoted to organizational clients had increased to double that
spent on personal and small-business clients.15 Thus, “hemisphere” was no
longer an accurate description.
One laudable effect of this growth surge was that racial and class divi-
sions between the two hemispheres began to crumble, as the corporate bar
needed to recruit beyond a handful of elite law schools.16 But the rapid
growth of the corporate sphere also exacerbated income inequality within
the profession. Chicago Lawyers II reported that between 1975 and 1995, the
mean income of lawyers in Chicago’s large law firms (with 100 or more
lawyers in 1975 and 300 or more lawyers in 1995) grew from $144,985 to
$271,706 in inflation-adjusted 1995 dollars.17 In contrast, the mean income
of a solo practitioner dropped from $115,694 to $80,075 (also in 1995 dol-
lars).18 Not surprisingly, only 2 percent of solo practitioners were working a
second job in 1975, compared with 32 percent in 1995.19
The Chicago Lawyers I and II studies are works of rigorous social sci-
ence. Thus, they provide a useful backdrop for evaluating the big-picture
change accounts offered by Harper and Susskind. Two interconnected in-
sights from Chicago Lawyers I and II help make sense of these two dramati-
cally different books.
The first insight is that the ability to make a living as a “people’s” lawyer
has been on the decline for several decades. Arguably, this has occurred be-
cause there have been no giant leaps forward in how lawyers solve legal
problems. Today, similar to a half century ago, lawyers meet with clients,
talk to them over the phone, write letters, contracts, memoranda, and court
documents, and make various in-person appearances on their clients’ behalf.
In contrast to the legal profession’s unchanging nature, manufacturing tech-
nology has advanced such that we currently enjoy better and cheaper cars
that require fewer workers to produce. Likewise, with the dawning of the
digital age, we have more information and no longer pay a daily toll for
newsprint. If technology has generated productivity gains for lawyers,
greater legal complexity has subsumed the resulting cost savings. As a result,
few lower- or middle-class people can afford several hours of a lawyer’s time
14. John P. Heinz et al., Urban Lawyers: The New Social Structure of the Bar
6–7 (2005); see also William Henderson, Second Look at the Second City, Legal Aff.,
Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 61, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-
2005/review_henderson_novdec05.msp (reviewing Heinz et al., supra).
15. Heinz et al., supra note 14, at 42–43, 316.
16. See id. at 95.
17. Id. at 163.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 164.
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to solve their legal problems.20 Unfortunately, without substantial gains in
productivity comparable to other industries, people’s lawyers are unable to
profitably tap into the latent demand for solutions to legal problems. If we—
the collective legal profession—grasped the full dimensions of this problem,
I suspect that we would find it more troubling, as it is at odds with our self-
image of promoting access to justice.
The second insight is that the declining fortunes of people’s lawyers
have been, in economic terms, more than counterbalanced by a surge of
growth in the corporate sphere. This aggregated prosperity has obscured
from plain view the seismic structural shift slowly occurring within the pro-
fession. But a time of inevitable reckoning occurred following the credit cri-
sis in the fall of 2008, when corporate legal departments were no longer able
or willing to pay the high fees of large firm corporate lawyers.21 Since that
time, the wealthy lawyers who manage the Am Law 100 (the 100 largest U.S.
law firms based on annual revenue) have begun to experience unease as their
revenues per lawyer began decreasing or, at best, remained flat. This devel-
opment ended a pattern of year-over-year growth that had existed since the
inception of the Am Law 100 in 1986.22
With average Am Law 100 profits in excess of $1 million per partner,23
hitting a revenue plateau is unlikely to engender much sympathy. But, as it
turns out, large and prestigious law firms are prone to collapse. Among the
firms included in the first Am Law 100 list in 1987, thirteen failed over the
next twenty-five years, a mortality rate of over 5 percent per decade.24 All
these failures share one common hallmark: partners with large books of bus-
iness lost faith in the enterprise and left for greener pastures, creating a pro-
verbial run on the bank.25 The responsive strategy of law firm leaders has
20. A similar development has occurred in the United Kingdom. See Legal Services
Benchmarking, Legal Services Board 19 (June 2012), http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/
what_we_do/Research/Publications/pdf/individual_consumers_use_of_legal_services_lsb_re-
port_17_07_12_ii.pdf (reporting the significant number of legal problems that British citizens
fail to redress because the cost of hiring a lawyer, from an individual consumer perspective, is
perceived as too high).
21. See Mark Harris, Seize the Day, Corp. Couns., Oct. 2011, at 55, 55 (observing that a
relatively small number of general counsels now have the pricing power to force law firms to
change); Ashley Post, More In-House Lawyers Are Exercising Power over Law Firms, Inside
Couns. (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/03/29/more-in-house-lawyers-
are-exercising-power-over-la (discussing an Association of Corporate Counsel survey revealing
that “corporate law departments are increasingly calling the shots”).
22. William D. Henderson, Rise and Fall, Am. Law., June 2012, at 56, 60 (examining
financial patterns in the Am Law 100 during the first twenty-five years of the list).
23. Id. at 59.
24. See id. at 58–59 (noting that the number of failed firms would rise from eleven to
thirteen if Dewey & LeBeouf failed, as that firm resulted from the merger of two firms on the
original list—Dewey Ballantine and LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae); Peter Lattman, Crip-
pled Firm in Bankruptcy Proceedings, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2012, at B1, available at http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE3D6153EF93AA15756C0A9649D8B63 (reporting
Dewey & LeBeouf’s demise).
25. See Henderson, supra note 22, at 60–61.
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been to attempt to pay market value to the firm’s heavy hitters to keep them
in the fold.26 Yet, to spur growth (or the perception of growth) in a flat
market for corporate legal services, a rival law firm may be willing to pay
more for partners who have portable clients. The profitability and geo-
graphic spread of large law firms create the illusion that they are strong,
monolithic institutions. Yet, on the inside, these firms feel very fragile, pri-
marily because the pace of lateral movement among corporate law firms
continues to increase.27
To ward off failure, leaders of these firms increasingly manage them to
benefit equity partners with big portable books of business—a demographic
that is, on average, fifty-five to sixty years old, relatively rich, and in no
mood to change. 28 Because clients are reluctant to pay for the time of junior
associates, corporate law firms cut their summer associate ranks in half be-
tween 2002 and 2012.29 The timing here is key—this change has been occur-
ring since 2002, not 2008. This fact strongly suggests that the large-scale
drop-off reflects a change that stretches well beyond any business cycle. Fur-
ther, to maximize profits for the few, the equity tier is getting smaller, while
a greater proportion of junior and middle-aged lawyers are permanently
parked in counsel positions or the nonequity tier.30 This is a new form of
leverage that can increase short-term profits, as clients are still willing to pay
for midlevel and senior expertise. This is a remarkably aggressive squeeze
play, as nonequity partner compensation has stagnated to pump up the in-
come of a smaller class of equity partners.31 The only way for an up-and-
coming lawyer to share in this wealth is to build and control a large book of
business. Knowing this, many equity partners have become very territorial
about who works on their matters and who talks to their clients.
26. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partner-
ships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1691 (2006) (discussing the importance of paying
partners the value of their marginal product and suggesting that the rise of the two-partner
structure is designed to achieve this goal).
27. See William Henderson & Christopher Zorn, Playing Not to Lose, Am. Law., Feb.
2013, at 56 (presenting various data concerning lateral partner trends and noting that the
overall volume of lateral movement has increased approximately 50 percent since 2000).
28. This observation is borne out by much of my informal fieldwork with law firms and
law firm leaders, as well as statistical work that I have done related to origination and billing
credits within large law firms. In a recent project, my colleagues and I observed that on aver-
age, a partner’s origination and billing receipts peak at age fifty-eight and then slowly trail off.
29. See William D. Henderson, Sea Change in the Legal Market, NALP Bull., Aug. 2013,
at 10, 10 (reviewing aggregate data culled from the National Association for Law Placement
(“NALP”) Directory of Legal Employers in 2002 and 2012 and finding a drop-off in summer
associates from 11,300 to 5,600 over that decade).
30. See id. at 11 & fig.2 (showing proportionate increase in counsel–senior attorney and
partnership ranks from 2002 to 2012 at the expense of associates and noting that most of the
growth in partnership ranks is within nonequity tiers).
31. See Jeffrey A. Lowe, Partner Compensation Survey, Major, Lindsey & Africa 7
(2012), http://www.mlaglobal.com/partner-compensation-survey/2012/FullReport.pdf (find-
ing, based on a survey of over 2,000 partners at major firms, that average nonequity compen-
sation dropped from $336,000 in 2010 to $335,000 in 2012, while average equity compensation
increased from $811,000 to $896,000).
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This turmoil at the top ranks of the legal profession is one of the key
fault lines across which both Harper and Susskind walk. With this Introduc-
tion in place, the balance of this Review will introduce readers to the change
accounts provided by these two seminal authors. Part I summarizes the key
elements of Harper’s The Lawyer Bubble, which is primarily a historical nar-
rative. Part II describes the emerging legal landscape of Tomorrow’s Lawyers,
with special emphasis on drivers of change that Susskind identifies. The rea-
son for this emphasis is simple. Those who understand the drivers are much
more likely to prosper in the years to come. The Conclusion offers final
observations and a straightforward thesis: It is time to let go of old ideas,
and to some extent, old institutions. Further, if we return to our first princi-
ples of professionalism, it is possible to both do good and do well.
I. Harper’s The Lawyer Bubble
There is one overriding fact you need to know about Steven Harper to
understand the structure and content of this important new book. He is a
highly accomplished trial lawyer who practiced law for over thirty years at
Kirkland & Ellis (Harper, pp. ix–x), a preeminent law firm known for tough,
bare-knuckles litigation. The Lawyer Bubble essentially puts two codefend-
ants on trial: the deans of the nation’s 200-plus law schools (Chapters One
to Three) and the managers of the nation’s large law firms (Chapters Four to
Eight). According to Harper, both sets of actors have sold out to the “culture
of short-termism” (Harper, p. xiii). The prize they are after is a higher posi-
tion in the industry’s primary league tables: the U.S News & World Report
law school rankings and the Am Law 200 rankings of firms by revenues and
profits (Harper, pp. xi–xii).32 Alas, they have forgotten that prestige is not a
worthy end in itself; rather, it is a by-product of the choices we make and the
lives we lead. A great trial lawyer will reduce her case to an easy-to-follow
narrative that establishes, factual-brick-by-factual-brick, how and why the
defendants committed the offense. Harper does this with formidable skill.
Let us start with the law schools—an environment that I ought to have
some comparative advantage in understanding. Here is a sample of Harper’s
opening argument:
The lawyer bubble began to form when vital institutions—law schools and
the American Bar Association (ABA)—abdicated their responsibilities in
favor of misguided metrics and insularity. Law school deans are supposed
to be the profession’s gatekeepers, but far too many have ceded indepen-
dent judgment in an effort to satisfy the mindless criteria underlying law
school rankings, especially U.S. News & World Report’s annual list.
(Harper, p. xi)
As an insider, I can quibble with Harper’s characterization but not in
any way that helps law school deans. These days, most professors assume
32. In 1999, The American Lawyer expanded the Am Law 100 by an additional 100 law
firms. This list, in turn, became the Am Law 200. No doubt this change was good for
circulation.
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that the dean’s job is to raise money for the law school. In that role, deans
invariably learn that alumni care deeply about the rankings of their law
schools. Further, law students care, too. In 1999, while I was a 1L student at
University of Chicago Law School, our school dropped from fourth to sixth
in the rankings. Shortly afterward, the dean placed an explanatory letter in
our student mailboxes. The letter acknowledged the seriousness of the mat-
ter and assured us that the drop was temporary.33 The dean of admissions—
who had admitted all of us—was then promptly reassigned. I recall one
impeccably credentialed classmate telling me, “Had I known we were going
to drop from four to six, I would have gone to NYU.”
Sure, law school deans ought to exercise independent judgment for the
good of the profession. But if we want actual independent judgment, akin to
that of an Article III federal judge, we need a different institutional struc-
ture. At present, law school deans are university middle managers, beholden
to a diverse array of stakeholders amid a highly competitive market for law
students and institutional prestige. Although it is true that most law school
deans have tenure, all of them are human. Harper places a lot of faith in
moral fortitude and resolve.34 Unfortunately, there is not an identifiable, let
alone clear, leadership path that a law school dean can follow to focus stead-
fastly on the educational mission and be confident that her institution will
emerge on the other side intact. Perhaps the various stakeholders are mis-
guided, but many sincerely believe that their own law schools would be bet-
ter off in both the short and long terms if their institutions more effectively
played the U.S. News rankings game.35 A dean is closer to a politician than a
priest—she cannot just ignore the views of the congregation and expect the
center to hold.
Rather than cowardice or lack of resolve by law school deans, an alterna-
tive explanation for this downward trend is that law schools are suffering
from a tragedy of the commons.36 In brief, there are some classes of
problems that only a regulator empowered to punish selfish short-term be-
havior can resolve. For example, conscience may be an inadequate tool to
curtail overfishing in the oceans. Most commentators would agree that the
33. Fourteen years later, the University of Chicago Law School did, in fact, climb back
into the number four spot. See Best Law Schools, U.S. News, http://grad-schools.usnews.rank-
ingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited Nov. 28,
2013) (listing the University of Chicago Law School as tied for fourth in the 2013 rankings).
34. See, e.g., Harper, p. xvi (“Those who attribute the current state of the legal profession
to market forces beyond anyone’s control are wrong. Human decisions created this mess; bet-
ter human decisions can clean it up.”).
35. See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, Editorial, Managing U.S. News & World Report—The
Enron Way, 48 Gonz. L. Rev. 423, 424 (2012–2013) (former law school dean acknowledging
the enormous ranking pressures on administrators from students, alumni, and faculty).
36. This concept ought to be familiar to anyone who has studied the field of law and
economics. Its origin traces back to a 1968 article by the ecologist Garrett Hardin. See Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
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gaming around of part-time students,37 transfers,38 contingent scholar-
ships,39 and student employment outcomes,40 which are some of the weap-
ons used in the U.S. News arms race, has brought shame and disrepute to
the legal academy. Further, because the rankings reward schools for high
spending on students,41 the cost of law school and average student debt loads
have skyrocketed.42 And yes, the number of students admitted to law school
today bears no relationship to the number of high-quality legal jobs readily
available on the back end. But how do law schools fix these problems with-
out either violating federal antitrust laws or destroying themselves by mak-
ing the proverbial first move?
If I sound skeptical of some of Harper’s criticisms, these disagreements
are fairly limited in scope. Drawing on his trial lawyer roots, Harper has
such a thorough command of law school minutiae that it would be difficult
for any law professor to step into the ring with him and expect to walk out
with a victory or a draw. Harper may heap criticism on the legal academy,
but he acknowledges the complexities at work, such as the naı¨vete´ of pro-
spective law students—a naı¨vete´ he recalls in himself when he enrolled at
Harvard Law School in the mid-1970s (Harper, pp. 3, 205). He also explains
the crazy incentives created by the federal government’s financing of legal
education—virtually providing a blank check for law schools yet forcing stu-
dents and taxpayers to bear all the risk (Harper, pp. 10–12, Chapter Three).
On law schools, Harper’s closing statement has a simple thesis:
“[N]otwithstanding the praiseworthy efforts on the part of a few, including
deans who recently have announced plans to reduce entering class size, a key
difficulty remains: a failure of vision” (Harper, p. 54). Here, I have to agree.
The problems facing legal education are indeed serious and exact real
37. See William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by
LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 Ind. L.J. 163 (2006) (report-
ing that law schools are increasingly diverting low-LSAT-scoring students into part-time pro-
grams to evade U.S. News reporting requirements while retaining revenue from these
students).
38. See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Tragedy of the Student Commons: Law School Transfers and
Legal Education, 60 J. Legal Educ. 616, 637–40 (2011) (discussing the incentive structures
around LSAT and undergraduate GPA statistics that lead high-prestige law schools to raid the
1L classes of their lower-prestige law school counterparts).
39. See Jerome Organ, How Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture of Law
School, 61 J. Legal Educ. 173 (2011) (discussing the advent of contingent scholarships, which
are designed to boost a school’s LSAT and undergraduate GPA median statistics while mini-
mizing the outlay of scholarship dollars).
40. See Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, Measuring Outcomes: Post-Gradua-
tion Measures of Success in the U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings, 83 Ind. L.J.
791, 803–05 (2008) (discussing evidence of puffery in employment statistics submitted to U.S.
News).
41. See Bill Henderson, Can Stanford Be #1 in the US News Rankings? The Data, Empiri-
cal Legal Studies (July 31, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_
studi/2010/07/can-stanford-be-1-in-the-us-news-rankings-the-data.html.
42. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools 107–11 (2012).
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human damage. Fixing these issues is going to be uncomfortable and incon-
venient for many. Yet, to enable us to rise to the occasion and confront
difficult problems such as these, most of us working in the legal academy
have been given tenure. We may not be natural leaders, but the buck has to
stop with us. Vision does not just fall from the sky. It evolves over time
through focused energy relentlessly applied to a very difficult problem with
no guarantee of success. I have tried to make my own substantial contribu-
tions,43 although Harper makes me question if I am doing enough. Many
others are working hard to forge a better way.44 Eventually, someone’s better
vision is bound to stick.
The balance of Harper’s analysis is directed at large law firms,45 a subject
he knows well. Harper’s thesis here is plain and relentless: the nation’s large
law firms have squandered their inheritances and lost their way. Although
lawyers at large firms comprise only 15 percent of practicing attorneys to-
day, Harper notes that “their influence is far greater than their numbers”
(Harper, p. xi), a sentiment widely shared by others.46 On numerous levels,
Harper demonstrates an astonishing mastery of the factual record. To build
his case, he collected nearly every shred of evidence available in the public
domain. I am a full-time academic who studies the legal profession. Based
on my experience, it appears that Harper turned over every possible rock
and then arrayed the record in a way that was most damaging to the defense.
As Harper points out, the available data suggest that large law firms are
comparatively unhappy places (Harper, pp. 58–63). Drawing on even more
industry data, Harper makes the case that dissatisfaction is attributable to
long hours, internal competition for pay and status, and dwindling chances
to make partner (Harper, pp. 64–70). I can quibble here a bit. On balance,
lawyers at large law firms do consistently express lower levels of satisfaction
than lawyers working for smaller firms, in-house legal departments, or the
government. But they are well compensated for the hardship, and the money
43. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 461 (2013).
44. Professor Tamanaha deserves special mention here for being brave enough to write a
book declaring that the law school emperor had no clothes, see Tamanaha, supra note 42, but
there are many others who think similarly. Fortunately, many law school consortia are now off
the ground and working to improve legal education.
45. What constitutes a “large” law firm has changed over time. Harper focuses primarily
on firms competing for positions in the Am Law 200 legal tables. Harper, pp. xii–xiii.
46. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 182 (1989) (reporting that as of
1980, only 9.2% of lawyers worked in law firms with more than twenty lawyers, yet “such
firms have become the most conspicuous feature in the American legal landscape”); Marc
Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big
Law Firm, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1867, 1869 (2008) (observing that the large firm sector is “the
fastest-growing, most prosperous, and most dynamic sector of the profession”); Bryant G.
Garth, Legal Education and Large Law Firms: Delivering Legality or Solving Problems, 64 Ind.
L.J. 433, 433 (1989) (“Large law firms are the most successful institutional component of the
American legal profession according to the criteria of economic prosperity, proximity to the
corridors of economic and political power, and the influence exerted on the legal profession
generally.”).
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and status can advance their other goals in life.47 Harper’s broader point,
however, is that it did not used to be this way. According to Harper, his first
decade or two at Kirkland & Ellis were imbued with a sense of civility and
professionalism that was ideal for mentoring young lawyers (Harper, pp.
68–69). Money was secondary but more than adequate. Since the subse-
quent advent of The American Lawyer league tables, Harper argues, large law
firms seemed to have lost their souls (Harper, pp. 70–72).
Harper suggests that if leaders of large law firms had not improvidently
placed firm size and profits above community and shared purpose, the
health of the firms, and by extension the profession, would be restored.48
Like any great trial lawyer, Harper builds his case through stories. He starts
with the rise and fall of Finley Kumble (Harper, pp. 104–09), the first major
law firm to be built entirely on star lateral partners.49 Finley Kumble debuted
at number two in the inaugural Am Law 100 in 1987, but within a few short
months, it was gone.50 Harper deftly makes the case that, one by one, virtu-
ally every major law firm collapse since then (Heller, Howrey, Thelen, etc.)
follows a similar Finley Kumble–type pattern: rapid expansion and heavy
reliance on laterals, shifting compensation to the big producers, overreliance
on bank credit to fund basic operations, a steady outflow of the middle-rank
partners unhappy with the changes, and a flourish of bravado before the fall
(Harper, pp. 128–32). Indeed, by virtue of its extreme parallels with the
trajectory of Finley Kumble, Dewey & LeBoeuf’s rise and fall serves as the
sole focus of Chapter Eight.
According to Harper, the firms that have avoided collapse are often held
together by little more than money. Harper quotes an internal email from
the chair of K&L Gates, a global law firm of forty-eight offices that were
knitted together over the last decade or so through mergers and lateral hir-
ing (Harper, pp. 117–18). The chair sent the email to the firm’s partnership
at the end of December, right before the firm closed its books for the year
(Harper, p. 118). The chair wrote,
47. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, The Fruits of Our La-
bors: An Empirical Study of the Distribution of Income and Job Satisfaction Across the Legal
Profession, 49 J. Legal Educ. 342, 365 (1999) (reporting an income–satisfaction trade-off
among Michigan Law alumni); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al., “The Pride of Indiana”: An
Empirical Study of the Law School Experience and Careers of Indiana University School of
Law–Bloomington Alumni, 81 Ind. L.J. 1427, 1457–62 (2006) (reporting that lawyers at large
firms experience a tension between satisfaction with their work and income and dissatisfaction
with their work–family balance).
48. Harper’s Epilogue could not make this clearer:
The baby boomer generation now in charge of almost everything has done some things
right, but it has made a mess of the legal profession. Time and again, the focus on short-
sighted metrics has sacrificed long-term vision. Nothing made that approach inevitable;
choices made it happen. Better choices can fix it.
Harper, p. 208.
49. See Henderson, supra note 22, at 59.
50. See id.; see also Harper, pp. 104–09.
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Many of you came from different cultures. I don’t care about your prior
acculturation. . . . We are a US-based global law firm. US law firms operate
on a cash basis of accounting. Our fees must be collected by midnight
within the fiscal year in which they are due. . . . I couldn’t care less whether
it appeals to you. It is who we are and therefore it is who you are.51
Harper then queries, “Is there room for other, nonmonetary values that tra-
ditionally have attracted some young lawyers to the profession, and if so,
how do firms encourage their survival?” (Harper, p. 119). Harper is troubled
that firm culture may be little more than the email’s final line, “Get us paid
by tomorrow.”52
Admittedly, all of this looks very bad. And therein lies the value of
Harper’s book. The legal profession has problems because appearances mat-
ter.53 We ought not to litigate this case, so to speak, by arguing that Harper
does not understand the nuances and complexities of being a law school
dean or a “BigLaw” managing partner in the twenty-first century (although,
for the record, these nuances and complexities are real). Why? Because when
we point to the root cause of our helplessness (U.S. News or the need to
forestall a “run on the bank” of partners leaving for other firms, for exam-
ple) we become obligated, as self-regulated professionals, to search in earnest
for a solution to these root causes. Harper claims that our problems flow
from a lack of moral resolve. Others point to misguided regulatory struc-
tures that doom law firms and law schools.54 A third criticism may be that
those who prospered under the old order are hindered in their ability to
adapt, thus causing their institutions to crumble.55 Perhaps it is a confluence
of all three explanations. But we ought to know one thing for sure: defensive
words will neither make us look good nor solve our problems.
Harper devotes Part III of this book to prescriptive solutions. None of
them is particularly controversial, and all of them would elevate the profes-
sion. For law schools, Harper suggests the following: confront the brutal
realities facing our graduates; modify or curtail federal loan programs so
51. Harper, p. 118 (citing Elie Mystal, The Two Faces of K&L Gates, Above the Law (Jan.
14, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/01/the-two-faces-of-kl-gates/ (reproducing
the text of an email reportedly sent by K&L Gates’s chair)).
52. Harper, p. 119 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Cf. James C. Freund, Lawyering: A Realistic Guide to Legal Practice 6 (1979)
(“If there’s one thing you learn in lawyering—as with the rest of life—it’s that appearances
rank only a shade behind reality in significance. . . . So when I talk about matters of optics, it’s
not to suggest hypocritical role-playing for which we’re all ill-suited; rather, it’s for the pur-
pose of bringing appearances into line with realities.”).
54. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 Va.
L. Rev. 1707 (1998) (citing ethical constraints on noncompetition agreements and nonlawyer
ownership as reasons for the inability of the legal profession to adapt to the changing needs of
clients); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation, Reg., Fall 2008, at 14 (same).
55. See William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers: Generalists, Specialists,
Project Managers, 70 Md. L. Rev. 373, 374 (2011) (noting that the transitions occurring in the
legal profession fit the old adage, “nothing fails like success” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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that law schools bear the risk of bad employment outcomes; restructure the
3L year; create a postgraduation training program; shrink law school enroll-
ments; continue the ongoing trend toward more transparency; and provide
reality therapy for prospective students (Harper, Chapter Nine). For law
firms, Harper provides the following solutions: awaken the federal judiciary
to its power to end the billable hour through the methods used to award
attorneys’ fees; rethink size; reduce profit-driven leverage; find high- poten-
tial recruits and give them meaningful work and honest evaluations; and
reopen the equity class to create a true partnership ethos among all firm
lawyers (Harper, Chapter Ten).
If put to a vote, a majority of the legal profession would likely sign on to
Harper’s proposals. There is no shortage of good will among lawyers. Unfor-
tunately, these worthy aspirations are mediated by market forces with all
their attendant uncertainties. The natural human impulse is to fix old and
familiar institutions. But from a social perspective, it may be better to let
them fail and create something new.
II. Susskind’s Tomorrow’s Lawyers
Like Harper’s The Lawyer Bubble, Richard Susskind’s Tomorrow’s Law-
yers offers a diagnosis for what ails the legal profession and a prescription
for the future. Yet, despite the overlap in subject matter and the quality of
the underlying analyses, it is hard to overstate the differences between these
two books. Simply put, Harper looks backward at the problems that plague
the legal establishment, while Susskind looks forward and describes the for-
midable changes ahead. In Harper’s case, the problems are so serious that
one is left wondering whether he has written about the last days of the old
guard. Susskind, in contrast, describes an emerging legal landscape that
many practicing lawyers and law students will find both foreign and
frightening.
Tomorrow’s Lawyers begins with a short inscription, quoting Alexander
Graham Bell, that partially captures the differences in emphasis and per-
spective between Susskind and Harper: “When one door closes, another
door opens; but we often look so long and so regretfully upon the closed
door that we do not see the ones which open for us” (Susskind, p. x).
A second inscription, this one from the contemporary writer Clay
Shirky, is particularly helpful to younger lawyers and law students trying to
make sense of their elders: “Institutions will try to preserve the problem to
which they are the solution” (Susskind, p. x). In the past, academic creden-
tials and institutional prestige were viewed as reliable proxies for identifying
the most skilled, capable lawyers. This was the structure of the legal market-
place in 1978, when the prestigious Chicago firm of Kirkland & Ellis hired
Harvard Law graduate Steven Harper. In more recent years, cost and pre-
dictability have become increasingly important to corporate legal depart-
ments, and on these key pain points, traditional elite institutions offer little
or no guidance. This breakdown in alignment between buyer and supplier
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opens the door for new entrants ready to deploy an ever-increasing array of
technological breakthroughs to solve a host of knotty legal problems.
During this period of transition, young lawyers are destined to be con-
fused. Should they pursue and accept positions in the “prestigious” old or-
der or cast their lot with the new legal entrepreneurs? Neither option
provides the sure career path that many law students seek.
If the reader is unfamiliar with Susskind, here are a few essential facts
you need to know. Susskind is Scottish and holds an LLB from the Univer-
sity of Glasgow.56 After qualifying to practice law, Susskind enrolled in a
PhD program at Oxford, where he focused on the unexplored terrain of law
and computers.57 His graduate work became the basis for his first book,
Expert Systems in Law.58 Although Susskind has enjoyed numerous academic
appointments over the years, in his primary vocation, he serves as a strategy
and technology consultant for many of the world’s most successful profes-
sional service organizations.59 Susskind could more than cut it as a full-time
academic, but he can certainly garner more income and influence from his
independent perch. For the most part, the accounting profession has em-
braced Susskind as an indispensable trusted advisor.60 In contrast, lawyers
view him with skepticism, although most are uncomfortable dismissing him
publicly.61
Why the discomfort? My favorite story on this front is Susskind’s 1996
prediction that email would someday replace the telephone as the dominant
method for lawyers and clients to communicate.62 At the time, the internet
was still a novelty limited to universities and computer aficionados. Prudent
and ethical lawyers would never succumb to such an insecure method of
client communications, or so said Susskind’s critics.63 Yet, nearly twenty
years later, lawyers have become chained to their computer devices and
smartphones, lest a client’s email does not receive a prompt reply. In the
introduction to Tomorrow’s Lawyers, Susskind asks the question, “Why
[l]isten to [m]e?” (Susskind, p. xvi). He answers it himself: “Even my fiercest
56. In the United Kingdom, law is an undergraduate degree.
57. See Richard Susskind, http://www.susskind.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
58. See Richard E. Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential Inquiry, at
vii (1987).
59. See Richard Susskind, supra note 57.
60. In public presentations, Susskind often acknowledges that his biggest and longest-
standing client engagement is with a “Big Four” accounting firm. Because accounting firms
have reinvented themselves as business consultants, Susskind’s ideas are presumably more
readily accepted.
61. This assertion is based on my own observation. I have attended several Susskind
lectures where the audience is comprised primarily of prosperous corporate lawyers.
62. See Richard Susskind, The Future of Law 137 (1996).
63. See Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers?: Rethinking the Nature of Legal
Services, at xxx (rev. ed. 2010) (“[I]n 1996, senior officials in [the Law Society of England
and Wales] said I should not be allowed to speak in public. I had been predicting then that
most lawyers and clients would soon communicate by e-mail, and the feeling was that I failed
to understand confidentiality and was bringing the profession into disrepute.”).
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critics will concede that . . . over the last 25 years I have been right more
often than wrong in my predictions” (Susskind, p. xvi). Yes, that is pretty
much spot on.
This book is by far Susskind’s most accessible and arguably his best. I
suspect that the convention that got him the most traction was his desire to
communicate directly with younger lawyers and prospective law students.
The opening passage makes it nearly impossible not to keep reading:
This book is a short introduction to the future for young and aspiring
lawyers.
Tomorrow’s legal world, as predicted and described here, bears little
resemblance to that of the past. Legal institutions and lawyers are at a
crossroads, I claim, and are poised to change more radically over the next
two decades than they have over the last two centuries. If you are a young
lawyer, this revolution will happen on your watch. (Susskind, p. xiii)
The book is a slender 165 pages that one might devour in a single sit-
ting. Young lawyers ought to read this book. But the people most likely to do
so are young partners at large law firms because many of them are beginning
to piece together the reality that their organizations are on an unsustainable
path—a realization that is fine for the fifty-five- and sixty-year-olds but a
potentially disheartening discovery for everyone else.
Tomorrow’s Lawyers is divided into three sections. Part I discusses the
radical changes beginning to unfold in the current legal marketplace. Part II
describes what the resulting legal landscape is likely to look like. And Part III
focuses on the prospects for young lawyers. Susskind acknowledges that
much of the revolutionary momentum is driven by clients of large corpora-
tions (the organizational clients described in the Chicago Lawyers I and II
studies64) who can no longer afford the rising costs and lack of innovation
offered by traditional large law firms.65 Yet, the good news is that the rising
tide of technology is likely to have a great democratizing effect on law, mak-
ing it more affordable and accessible to the masses (the personal services
hemisphere may make a comeback!). In the years to come, idealistic legal
entrepreneurs will have the opportunity to do good and do well.66 In the
process, however, we will likely lose the insular academic and professional
guilds of the artisan lawyer.
According to Susskind, the three drivers of this change are “the ‘more-
for-less’ challenge, liberalization [better known in the United States as mar-
ket deregulation], and information technology” (Susskind, p. 3). The more-
for-less challenge constitutes a phenomenon pertaining primarily to organi-
zational clients. Some highly esteemed scholars have argued that law is a
64. See supra notes 10–19 and accompanying text.
65. See Susskind, pp. 3–5.
66. See, e.g., Susskind, p. 83 (“For those aspiring lawyers who hoped for a career akin to
that enjoyed by lawyers of their parents’ generation, they will be disappointed. For those who
seek new opportunities and wish to participate in bringing about the advances that I predict in
this book, I believe there has never been a more exciting time.”).
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mature industry.67 Yet, in a rapidly globalizing and regulated world, law be-
comes even more important to maintain stability and civility. What has be-
come mature, however, are particular ways of provisioning law to
stakeholders. We do not really notice when the poor and the dispossessed, or
even the middle class, cannot afford access to the legal system. But when
corporate clientele complain about bills, the rules of the road are likely to
change for their benefit. And those clientele need and want better, faster,
and cheaper methods of solving and preventing their legal problems.
In terms of liberalization, Susskind refers primarily to the market re-
forms in the United Kingdom and Wales, which have opened the doors for
nonlawyers to capitalize, own, and manage businesses that provide legal ser-
vices (Susskind, pp. 5–9). These reforms are akin to U.S. state bars repealing
Rule 5.4.68 In the United Kingdom, the primary rationale for the liberaliza-
tion is that the previously closed market underserved ordinary citizens.69
Susskind predicts that within ten years or so, “most major jurisdictions in
the West” will move toward similar reforms.70
Susskind’s third driver of change is information technology (“IT”), al-
though the engineers and scientists are unlikely to arrive on the scene by
themselves. Instead, venture capitalists and private equity–types who are
hoping to profit from the transition will invite them. Citing the achievement
of Watson, IBM’s artificial intelligence system that won a 2011 Jeopardy!
championship on live broadcast television, Susskind notes that “there is no
finishing line for IT and the Internet” (Susskind, pp. 12–13). Sure, IT will
speed up modern law practice through various forms of automation. But
Susskind suggests that new technologies will open the door to entirely new
ways of practicing law (Susskind, p. 13).
Susskind divides the coming innovations into two groups: sustaining
technologies and disruptive technologies. Sustaining technologies “are those
that support and enhance the way that a business or a market currently
operates” (Susskind, p. 39). Telephones, desktop computers, fax machines,
email, smartphones and tablets, and electronic filings surely fall into this
camp. Disruptive technologies, in contrast, “fundamentally challenge and
change the functioning of a firm or a sector” (Susskind, p. 39). Outside the
67. E.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Is Law a “Mature” Industry?, ProfessorBainbridge.com
(July 9, 2009, 12:42 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/
07/is-law-a-mature-industry.html.
68. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2013) (prohibiting business combina-
tions between lawyers and nonlawyers when any portion of the business involves the practice
of law).
69. See Susskind, pp. 84–85 (noting that “research in England and Wales conducted a
few years ago concluded that around one million civil justice problems go unresolved each
year”).
70. Susskind, p. 9. As I have noted elsewhere, an enormous amount of the changes that
Susskind envisions can occur without market liberalization, as one can view everything up
until the courtroom door or “client counseling moment” as a legal input or process that can
be purchased from a nonlawyer supplier. See William Henderson, Losing the Law Business,
Cayman Fin. Rev., First Quarter 2013, at 78, 78.
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legal field, the paradigmatic example of a disruptive technology is digital
camera technology, which led to the demise of Kodak, a once-dominant
brand in the chemical film industry (Susskind, p. 39).
For lawyers and law students, the word “disruption” is bound to have an
unnerving connotation. But, as Susskind points out, “For the buyer of legal
services, this disruption is often very good news indeed” (Susskind, p. 40).
Susskind sees at least thirteen disruptive technologies in law (Susskind, p.
40), which he discusses one by one in Chapter Five and throughout the rest
of the book. These technologies generally follow some variation of better,
faster, or cheaper, although the cost curves are relentlessly headed down-
ward. Thus, to my mind, the disruptive technologies fall into two main
buckets: faster–cheaper and better–cheaper.
The faster–cheaper bucket includes the following: (1) automated docu-
ment assembly, which cuts out fees for drafting and customization; (2) re-
lentless connectivity, which sets up a responsiveness expectation that
undermines the work and social lives of lawyers; (3) e-learning, which sup-
plants the lecture element of academic learning and potentially much more;
(4) online legal guidance, which organizes legal information to facilitate cli-
ent self-help; (5) legal open-sourcing, which puts standard documents,
checklists, and flowcharts into the public domain; (6) closed legal communi-
ties, where law firm work products that corporate clients paid for can be
pooled together and shared as a common resource; (7) workflow and project
management, which wring out the inefficiency of the billable hour; and (8)
online dispute resolution, which has proved its muster on eBay and properly
raises the question whether court is a “service” or a “place.”71
The better–cheaper bucket is perhaps even more corrosive to existing
institutions. These disruptive technologies include the following: (9) elec-
tronic legal marketplaces, where firms and lawyers are credibly rated by cur-
rent and former clients on the basis of quality, cost, and value; (10)
embedded legal knowledge, which essentially builds trip wires to keep em-
ployees or citizens from breaching contracts or transgressing safety regula-
tions; (11) intelligent legal search engines, which supplant not only junior
lawyers and paralegals but also legal process outsourcers, as humans are sim-
ply outmatched; (12) big data, which will reveal insights for predicting legal
outcomes and identifying and mitigating legal risk; and (13) artificial intelli-
gence–based problem solving, which essentially unleashes computers akin to
IBM’s Watson on the types of legal problems currently handled by living,
breathing lawyers prone to various forms of cognitive bias and bounded
rationality.72
If the reader scoffs at such fanciful visions of the future or protests that
they are overstated, I have only one reply: time will tell if Susskind is right. I
have ample experience observing how lawyers and law professors respond to
Susskind’s ideas, as I have heard him speak live on half a dozen occasions.
The reaction, I can assure you, is never one of wonderment. Rather, the
71. See Susskind, pp. 41–47, 99–102.
72. See Susskind, pp. 42–43, 46–49.
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general tenor tends to be skepticism mixed with fear, as individual audience
members process the extent to which their cheese will be imperiled if Suss-
kind is even partially right.73
Chapter Eight is entirely dedicated to the timing of these changes, which
Susskind predicts will unfold in three stages. Stage 1 is denial, which, ac-
cording to Susskind, describes the present state in which legal departments
dicker with law firms over cost-containment strategies (Susskind, pp.
77–79), such as volume discounts. These efforts, in turn, fail to produce
significant innovations in how legal work is organized and performed. Stage
2 is re-sourcing. This stage is characterized by legal departments becoming
more open to nontraditional legal vendors and law firms embracing tech-
nology and process improvement to survive (some will, many will not, ac-
cording to Susskind) (Susskind, pp. 3, 79–80). Stage 3 will be full-blown
disruption, when entirely new businesses and institutions will overtake the
old order (Susskind, pp. 81–83). Susskind illustrates the transition through
these stages in the following diagram (Susskind, p. 77 fig.8.1):
Figure 1
The Three Stages of Change
To my mind, the true paradigm-shifting innovations identified by Suss-
kind tend to have one killer theme in common: whenever practicable, one-
to-one artisan lawyering is giving way to one-to-many modes of legal prob-
lem solving. As Susskind notes in the final section of the book, this trend is
extremely problematic for today’s law students, as law schools are teaching a
craft that is relevant to a tranche of legal work destined to shrink in the years
73. One of the best-selling business books of all time is a fable on how to deal with
unwelcomed change in our life circumstances. See Spencer Johnson, Who Moved My
Cheese? (1998).
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to come (Susskind, pp. 135–39). Indeed, it is only now beginning to dawn
on law school faculty that the legal industry of the future will be profoundly
interdisciplinary.74 And I am not talking about law and economics or law
and psychology, although these disciplines will certainly remain relevant.
Rather, one will find the greatest frontiers (and fortunes) at the intersection
of law and systems engineering, computational linguistics, and process
management.
Conclusion
In the final chapter of Tomorrow’s Lawyers, Susskind retells a story—
well known in corporate circles but less so among lawyers—of the world’s
leading manufacturer of power tools assembling its new executives for an
entry-level training course. The training facilitators present the new recruits
with a slide showing a gleaming power drill and ask whether this product is
what the company sells (Susskind, pp. 157–58). One by one, the new re-
cruits slowly muster the courage to say, “ ‘Yes, this is indeed what the com-
pany sells.’ ” The trainers then move to the next slide, which shows a hole
neatly drilled into a piece of wood. “ ‘This,’ they say, ‘is actually what our
customers want, and it is your job as new executives to find ever more crea-
tive, imaginative, and competitive ways of giving our customers what they
want’ ” (Susskind, p. 158).
As a legal educator, I am hesitant to embrace metaphors that do little
more than extol the commercial marketplace. I generally advocate that law-
yers need more critical detachment and less ideology (close to zero is the
right amount). That said, as a practical matter, if the goal is indeed to de-
light the customer, then a thoroughgoing knowledge of the customer’s pref-
erences is absolutely indispensable. In the case of law, there is ample
evidence to suggest that both corporate legal departments and ordinary citi-
zens would like to have fewer legal problems. And for those problems that
remain, they would like them dispensed with in a timelier and less expensive
manner.75
My point here is a very simple one: there is tremendous pent-up de-
mand for better, faster, and cheaper legal products and services. This fact
alone raises certain issues of professional responsibility, at least for U.S. law-
yers. Each spring, I guide students in my Legal Professions class through the
74. See, e.g., Rachel M. Zahorsky & William D. Henderson, Who’s Eating Law Firms’
Lunch?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2013, at 32, 38, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/arti-
cle/whos_eating_law_firms_lunch (“A technology-driven revolution is overturning how
America practices law, runs its government and dispenses justice. The revolution has so far
gone almost completely unnoticed by the people who teach aspiring lawyers. This has to
change.” (quoting Professor Goodenough) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75. Consensus, however, may depend on whether we are all behind Rawls’s veil of igno-
rance. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing that principles of social
fairness are more readily discernible when individuals are deprived of any guarantees on their
starting position).
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Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, drawing their atten-
tion to paragraph [9], which reads, “Virtually all difficult ethical problems
arise from conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while
earning a satisfactory living.”76 If this passage is true, it likely follows that the
transition from one-to-one artisan lawyering to one-to-many IT–enabled
legal systems lays the foundation for the mother of all ethical dilemmas, at
least for lawyers who lack the tools and expertise to profit from this brave
new world.
Although practicing lawyers and law professors have financial incentives
to resist the marginalization, if not the obsolescence, of artisan lawyering, a
bigger obstacle is arguably the presence of mental frames that make it nearly
impossible to envision alternative paths. The famous physicist Max Planck
once wrote, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its op-
ponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”77 If
the physicists can fall prey to mental frames, lawyers are unlikely to fare any
better. Perhaps this explains why some of the leading innovators in today’s
large corporate legal departments, such as Mark Chandler (of Cisco Systems,
Inc.) and Paul Beach (of United Technologies), never worked in traditional
corporate law firms—arguably, it would have ruined them. As water runs
downhill, the best innovations will eventually be studied, copied, and
adopted by others. But because of old mental frames, these changes will
occur more slowly than reason and self-interest might dictate.
I was recently jarred out of my own mental frame when I reviewed data
on the composition of the nation’s largest law firms over the last thirty-five
years. The long-standing conventional wisdom is that large law firms have
been steadily increasing leverage in pursuit of ever-higher profits per part-
ner.78 I was a subscriber to this persistent narrative. Yet, as shown in the time
series plot below, the data tell a different story79:
76. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl., para. 9 (2013).
77. Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers 33–34 (Frank Gay-
nor trans., 1949).
78. See, e.g., Harper, p. 77 (“Firms create leverage by hiring far more entry-level associ-
ates than they ever intend to promote into the equity partnership. . . . [T]he equity partners
make a lot of money on those associates during the years preceding the up-or-out equity
partnership decision.”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 749, 760
(suggesting that the incentive structure of modern law firms is to “increase associate leverage
and billable hours” to meet the compensation expectations of rainmaker partners).
79. William Henderson & Evan Parker-Stephen, The Diamond Law Firm: A New Model
or the Pyramid Unraveling?, Lawyer Metrics (Dec. 3, 2013), http://lawyermetrics.com/2013/
12/03/the-diamond-law-firm-a-new-model-or-the-pyramid-unraveling/.
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Figure 2
Average Percentage of Partners and Associates: NLJ 250,
1977–2012
Among the nation’s 250 largest law firms, the high-water mark for
traditional partner–associate leverage occurred nearly a quarter century ago.
It took a precipitous drop in the early 1990s and expanded again during the
heyday of the “dot.com era” but has trailed off ever since. In the meantime,
firms have created and expanded new categories of lawyers, such as staff
attorneys and counsel.80 Further, essentially all the growth in the partnership
ranks has occurred within the nonequity tier.81 The trend lines in the dia-
gram above do not reflect a business model that exploits young lawyers;
rather, they reveal a business model that is steadily forsaking them. This
does not bode well for BigLaw’s future, especially as new legal vendors offer
alternative paths that appear far more sustainable.
After reading The Lawyer Bubble and Tomorrow’s Lawyers, I was re-
minded of yet another book written by a lawyer, Daniel Pink’s A Whole New
Mind.82 Pink’s thesis is that we are moving into an economic and political
era in which traditional left-brain analytical thinking will be insufficient to
secure lucrative, lifelong employment, primarily because “abundance, Asia,
and automation” are steadily increasing competitive pressures on knowledge
workers.83 Pink’s insightful book suggests that the solution to this competi-
tive dynamic is to cultivate the emotive, empathic, aesthetic, and storytelling
components of our right brain, creating a whole new mind that is more
80. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 11.
81. Id.
82. Daniel H. Pink, A Whole New Mind (2005). Pink is a graduate of Yale Law School
who worked for then–Vice President Gore before taking up writing full time.
83. See id. ch. 5 (explaining the impact of abundance, Asia, and automation on knowl-
edge workers, particularly in the United States).
April 2014] Letting Go of Old Ideas 1131
adept at problem solving and hence in higher demand by clients and em-
ployers. No doubt, this is good advice for today’s college graduates. But as a
matter of national policy, it is wholly inadequate.
In the years to come, the unfettered forces of abundance, Asia, and
automation are likely to be enormously disruptive politically, socially, and
economically. Tomorrow’s Lawyers arguably presents a mere (and mild) mi-
crocosm of a problem with much higher stakes that affects virtually every-
one here and abroad. Perhaps in a highly globalized yet atomized society,
controlling the fallout from the pressures of abundance, Asia, and automa-
tion is too big a task for anyone to take on. Yet, how to control this fallout is
the type of dilemma that lawyers have historically sought to resolve, some-
times at the expense of our own parochial interests. I certainly hope we try.
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